An investigation of what might be called the logical formalization of the process of theory change due to anomalies is presented. By anomaly, we mean an observed fact falling into the explanatory scope of a theory that does not agree with the theory prevision. A classical approach to restore the explicative power of a theory faced with an anomaly is to propose new, tentative auxiliary hypotheses which, along with part of the old set of auxiliary hypotheses, are able to solve the anomaly. After laying down some conclusions about the structure of such process, we propose a multi-modal and non-monotonic logical framework able to represent some key aspects of this important facet of the dynamics of scientific theories. Due to the necessity of accommodating incompatible tentative hypotheses, this framework incorporates a weak form of paraconsistency. As a case study, we analyze the anomalous behaviour of the planet Uranus that threatened the Newtonian celestial mechanics for more than half a century and gave rise to the discovery of Neptune.
Introduction
Our purpose in this article is to provide a logical analysis of the process of theory revision due to anomalies. By anomaly, we mean an observed fact falling into the explanatory scope of a theory that does not agree with the theory prevision. Our focus shall be on what certainly is the classical approach to restore the explicative power of the theory: to propose new, tentative auxiliary hypotheses which, along with part of the old set of auxiliary hypotheses, are able to solve the anomaly. As a final result of this analysis, we propose a multi-modal and non-monotonic logical framework able to represent some key aspects of this important facet of the dynamics of scientific theories.
As a case study, we examine what is perhaps the most famous case of scientific anomaly-the anomalous behaviour of Uranus that threatened the Newtonian celestial mechanics for more than half a century and gave rise to the discovery of Neptune-based on which some basic conclusions about the structure of scientific change due to anomalies are laid down. This is done in Sections 2 and 3. We then propose a multi-modal logic incorporating a weak form of paraconsistency able to represent the several kinds of statements a theory might have, which include established laws, accepted auxiliary hypotheses and tentative hypotheses. This is done in Sections 4 and 5. As we shall see there, this paraconsistency is needed in order to accommodate the several incompatible tentative auxiliary hypotheses, which might be proposed to solve the anomaly. We then introduce a non-monotonic logic capable of representing the refutable aspect of auxiliary hypotheses; along with the mentioned multi-modal logic, this non-monotonic logic allows us to formalize in a minimally satisfactory way the process of theory change due to anomalies. This is done in Sections 6 and 7. Finally, in Section 8, we lay down some conclusive remarks.
The anomalous behaviour of Neptune: a bit of history of physical astronomy
By the end of the 1830s in the field of physical astronomy almost everything was proceeding smoothly. By several reasons, the Newtonian theory had shown to be the best framework to describe celestial phenomena. With the help of its postulates, it was possible to explain successfully the action of the earth upon the moon, the nature of the path of comets and Kepler's three laws of planetary motion. Furthermore, the law of universal gravitation allowed the development of a theory of planetary perturbation by which the positions of the planets could be predicted with extraordinary precision. The only exception to this list of successes was the motion of the recently discovered planet Uranus.
Discovered in 1781 by William Herschel, Uranus was a sensational and unexpected augmentation in the two thousand years accepted number of solar planets. However, the method that had been used successfully for predicting the position of the other planets could not have the same success in the case of the new planet. Every attempt to calculate Uranus' orbit and draw up a table of its future positions in the sky based on that orbit had failed. Each time the same thing happened: Uranus would adhere to the predictions for a few years and would then slowly start to drift away from the expected course.
The basic step in the calculation of a planet's motion consists in determining its 'true' orbit or unperturbed ellipse, that is to say, the elliptical orbit it would follow if it were exclusively under the attractive influence of the sun. This is done with the help of a few widely separated observations of its varying positions along with the gravitational effects exerted by the perturbing planets on these positions. By subtracting the second from the first, we can get the elements of the 'true' orbit of the planet, by means of which any position of the planet in this 'true' orbit can be calculated for any time. Finally, by taking the perturbations of the perturbing planets into account again, the actual position of the planet can be easily calculated.
In the case of the calculation of Uranus' tables, the two perturbing bodies taken into consideration were Jupiter and Saturn. Due to the unawareness of the existence of a third body whose gravitational field was also strong enough to influence Uranus' motion, the predictions of these tables were predestined to fail. There would always be error in the determination of the 'true' orbit of Uranus (when the influence of the perturbing bodies would be subtracted) as well as in the calculation of its actual positions (when the same influence would be added).
In 1841, after reading George Airy's book on the progress in astronomy, the British mathematics student John Couch Adams became aware of the theoretical problems with Uranus' motion. Even though he had never had any professional training in astronomy, he thought he possessed the skills to solve the mystery. Even though his mathematical expertize was undoubtedly among such skills, a very fundamental assumption made him capable of explaining the mystery: the hypothesis that there was an unknown planet beyond Uranus revolving the sun whose gravitational effect upon Uranus was preventing its calculated positions from fitting the observed positions. By considering this new hypothesis, Adams wanted to deduce from the available data on Uranus the elements of the 'true' orbit of Uranus as well as the elements of the 'true' orbit and mass of the unknown planet.
Logical formalization of theory change and scientific anomalies 3
In the case of one planet acting upon another and disturbing its motion, the theory of perturbation enables us to express the correction to the calculated positions (or coordinates) of the disturbed planet in terms of the masses and the elements of the orbits of the two planets. (Note that the correction to the coordinates of the disturbed planet is the same as how much it distances itself from the orbit it would follow if the gravitational influence of the disturbing body did not exist.) In the case of Uranus and the unknown planet, which we know was Neptune, since the mass of Uranus was known, these corrections would be expressed in terms of one known quantity and three unknown quantities: the mass of Uranus (the known quantity) and the elements of the 'true' orbits of Uranus and Neptune and the mass of Neptune. If Adams' hypothesis were true, these corrections should account for the differences between the observed positions of Uranus and the positions computed through the old tables. That is to say, the perturbation caused by Neptune upon Uranus at a certain time should be equal to the difference between the calculated and observed positions at that time. By comparing the formulae for the corrections to the coordinates of Uranus with the difference between the positions predicted by the table and the observed positions at several different times, a number of equations could be formed; Adams' original mystery would then be reduced to the elimination of the unknown quantities in these equations.
The original inferential schema on which Adams worked had as its premises the elements of the 'true' orbit of Uranus and Neptune (let us call them E U and E N , respectively) and the masses of these two planets (let us call them M U for Uranus and M N for Neptune). Besides the laws of classical mechanics and the law of universal gravitation (which we will represent by T CM ), it also was part of the premises the hypothesis that the unseen planet's orbit was elliptical 2 and that its average distance from the sun was twice that of Uranus. Let us represent these two hypotheses by O. The conclusion of these premises, i.e. the 'amount of perturbation' exerted by Neptune upon Uranus, was supposed to be identical to the corrections to the coordinates of Uranus' tables, i.e. |OP 1 −CP 1 |, |OP 2 −CP 2 |, …, |OP n −CP n |, where OP i and CP i are, respectively, the observed and the calculated positions of Uranus at time t i . Putting everything together, we have the following set of inferences:
Here, however, the real goal of Adams' calculations (E U ,E N ,M N ) is not in the conclusion, but among the premises. The point is that due to the number of equations considered by Adams, 3 the range of values of E U , E N and M N that would satisfy all the equations at the same time was restricted in such a way that they (the values) could be uniquely obtained through deductive reasoning. Therefore, the actual schema that represents the inferential process done by Adams is the following:
By performing this inference Adams was able at the same time to explain the observed motion of Uranus (by discovering the values for E U ) and its hitherto abnormal behaviour as well as to predict the position of Neptune.
Prediction, explanation and auxiliary hypotheses
From Adam's times up to now, many people have wondered how could someone, making use only of theoretical tools and past observations and without taking even a single look at the sky, be able to determine with an impressing degree of accuracy the position of a hitherto unknown planet. In fact, the so-called prediction of Neptune is even nowadays considered as one of the most impressing achievements of physical science.
The prediction of an individual fact (like the position and mass of a planet) is traditionally taken as being a deductive argument where the conclusion is the fact to be predicted and the premises are composed by at least one law belonging to a scientific theory and a set of particular facts and initial conditions, usually called auxiliary hypotheses. 4 Restricting the prediction to one theory and stopping at the theory level of detail (i.e. not aiming to distinguish which laws are in order, but just the theory they belong to), this can be represented by the following schema:
We shall call the pair composed by a theory T and a set of auxiliary hypotheses H a theoretical system (which we shall represent by the symbol .) Now, given argument (1), it seems that the prediction of Neptune's orbit is quite usual and fits perfectly our schema. However, if we are to properly represent the logical structure of Neptune's prediction we have to consider a fundamental hypothesis without which the conclusion of (1) could never be obtained: the hypothesis that
There exists an unknown planet beyond Uranus whose gravitational effect upon it is preventing the calculated positions from fitting the observed data.
More specifically, representing (1) according to our schema of scientific prediction requires N to appear as one of the auxiliary hypotheses.
The problem with that is that N was not part of the set of auxiliary hypotheses of the Newtonian theoretical system for describing planetary motion at the time of Adam's calculations (let us call it H U ). In fact, to this set of auxiliary hypotheses, which include the statement (S)
The solar system consists of exactly Mercury, Venus, Earth, Jupiter, Saturn, and Uranus.
, N could not even be consistently added. Of course, as we shall see later, some slight modification could be made in S as to allow the addition of N. However, this would be no more than an intellectual exercise: since N was not an accepted auxiliary hypothesis (which of course had to do with the nonexistence of empirical support for it), conclusions made with its help could not be considered as authentic scientific predictions. We seem then to have arrived at an impasse. The calculation of Neptune's position is very often said to be one of the best and more fascinating examples of the predictive power of science. How is it that we have now reached the conclusion that it is not a scientific prediction at all?
We have said earlier that an anomaly is an observed fact that does not agree with the theory prevision. An equivalent definition would go as follows: an anomaly is an observed fact falling into the explanatory scope of a theory that cannot be explained by the theory along with the accepted auxiliary hypotheses. Limiting the explanation to singular facts and again restricting the analysis to the theory-level of detail, an explanation can be represented by the following schema:
Auxiliary hypotheses P Fact to be explained According to this model then, the only difference between an explanation and a prediction is that while predictions refer to unknown events, an explanation concerns a known phenomenon.
5
A scientific anomaly then arises when there is some observed phenomenon A such that the theoretical system is not able to explain it. This incapability of explaining A comes not only from the impossibility of A being deduced from the theoretical system (T∪H A), which would be indicative of just an incompleteness of the system, but actually from A being inconsistent with (T∪H ¬A). In the case of Uranus, letting OP i be the observed positions of Uranus at one of the mentioned periods of time t i , we have that T CM ∪H U OP i and T CM ∪H U ¬OP i (the calculated position at time t i -CP i -is such that T CM ∪H U CP i and CP i →¬OP i .)
In order to recover its explicative power, should be substituted by a new theoretical system ' such that ' is consistent and ' A. Given our characterization of , this could be done either by modifying T or by modifying H. The standard method in scientific theory revision is to do all the possible efforts to fix the system by working on H. The changing of the laws of the theory is always taken as 'a last resort to which it cannot be permitted to have recourse without having exhausted the examination of other causes, and having shown them to be unable to produce the observed effects', as J. Le Verrier stated. 6 From the point of view of the evolution of theories, this strategy of solving anomalies implies that while the laws of T cannot be questioned, the auxiliary hypotheses H are, to a certain extent, open to discussion. 7 Therefore, for the sake of methodology, some parts of the theoretical system are taken as well established while some others are taken as refutable. From an epistemological point of view, non-refutability is assimilated to certainty while refutability is related to plausibility, for even if the auxiliary hypotheses are in risk of being given up, there must be some good reasons supporting their presence in the theoretical system. In this way, we can say that the laws of the theory, which make what Imre Lakatos [10] calls the inner core of the theory, are to be taken as certain, irrefutable statements; and most auxiliary hypotheses, which we might say serve as a protective belt that safeguards the theory against refutations, are more akin to revise and therefore not certain but just plausible.
Thus, when an anomaly arises, the initial approach is to keep the basic principles of the theory T unchanged and work on the set of auxiliary hypotheses H. This is done by proposing several tentative auxiliary hypotheses to solve the problem. But in which conditions may we say a tentative auxiliary hypothesis solves an anomaly? Trivially when it is able, along with the theory and a proper subset of the old set of auxiliary hypotheses, to explain the anomalous phenomenon; in other words, when the new tentative hypothesis h is such that T∪H' ∪ {h} is a consistent set such that
Here H' is the biggest subset of H such that T∪H' ∪ {h} is consistent, or equivalently, the subset of H such that for all h' ∈ H−H', the set T∪H' ∪ {h, h'} is inconsistent. (Since T∪H ¬A, H' has to be a proper subset of H.) The requirement that H' must be the biggest subset of H reflects the idea that we should change the least we can in order to recover the explicative power of the theory. We call these conditions the tentative auxiliary hypotheses (TAH) principle. The final solution for the problem is of course achieved when we get enough reasons for accepting one of the tentative auxiliary hypotheses h, in the case which h becomes part of the accepted set of auxiliary hypotheses. However, during the period when the anomalous situation remains and no decision is made in favour of one of the tentative hypotheses, once a given hypothesis h satisfies the TAH principle, even though it is not an accepted hypothesis, it becomes more than a mere hypothesis; we might say it becomes a plausible auxiliary hypothesis, for in the light of (2) it is not an arbitrary hypothesis, but one capable to explain the anomaly.
This plausibility, however, must be distinguished from the sort of plausibility that accepted auxiliary hypotheses, in non-anomalous times for instance, enjoy. Even though these accepted hypotheses are refutable, the rationale in favour of them is supposedly stronger than the one in favour of a tentative auxiliary hypothesis. While accepted auxiliary hypotheses (when taken along with the whole theoretical system they belong to) are supposed to have many exemplars of successful predictions and explanations, a tentative auxiliary hypothesis has a very short period of existence that does not warrant its acceptance. Moreover, there is usually more than one tentative auxiliary hypothesis satisfying the TAH principle and trying to account for the same anomaly, which implies a sort of incompatibility among these tentative auxiliary hypotheses. We therefore say that while the auxiliary hypotheses in non-anomalous times are strongly plausible or plausibly accepted, the tentative hypotheses are weakly plausible.
In the case of Uranus, one of the tentative hypotheses proposed was N. By itself, N could not explain, in the sense defined above, the anomalous behaviour of Uranus. However, by conjoining N with the true orbit of Uranus (E U ) and the mass and true orbit of this unknown planet (M N and E N , respectively), and modifying H U in such a way as to make the resulting set of hypotheses (let us call it H N ) consistent with N and E U (which means to replace the 'exactly' in S by 'at least' and to remove the old data regarding the true orbit of Uranus), the anomaly could be explained. From a deductive point of view, this means that the laws of classical mechanics along with the law of universal gravitation (T CM ) conjoined with this new set of auxiliary hypotheses were enough to infer the observed positions of Uranus; or, in symbols,
Thus, by finding the values of E U , M N and E N what Adams did was to show (3) to be valid. In other words, by working on (1), Adams showed that the new set of hypotheses H N ∪{N,E U ,M N ,E N } could effectively explain the anomalous behaviour of Uranus. See that (3) was not enough to transform N into an accepted auxiliary hypothesis. This was achieved only when a planet positioned in the surroundings of the coordinates given by Le Verrier was empirically discovered and whose observed orbit fitted the previsions. However, (3) somehow changed the status of N. Calling h N the conjunction of N, E U , M N and E N , it was beyond doubt that h N could explain the discrepancies between the anomalous and the observed motions of Uranus: it satisfied the TAH principle. Consequently, even though N was not yet an accepted hypothesis, it (or its formal version h N ) could be considered as a plausible auxiliary hypothesis, for it did not have any more the arbitrary character that made us conclude in the first place that it was not an authentic auxiliary hypothesis.
We are now in a position to answer the question regarding the nature of Neptune prediction we posed at the beginning of this section. Since N was not an accepted auxiliary hypothesis, (1) could not effectively be considered as an authentic scientific prediction. However, (3) showed N to be a plausible auxiliary hypothesis, which entitles us to take (1) as a plausible scientific prediction.
In other to finish this section, we recall that this typical process of mending a theoretical system failing to explain an observational fact A works by the proposal of several competing tentative hypotheses h 1 ,...,h n , in such a way that, for each h i there is H i ' ⊂ H such that T∪H i ' ∪ {h i } A and T∪H i ' ∪ {h i } ¬A. Trivially then, once a tentative auxiliary hypothesis is shown to satisfy the TAH principle we must be ready to incorporate it into the theoretical system as one of the auxiliary hypotheses. But as we said, each one of these h i 's is incompatible with all others in the sense that they consist of mutually exclusive, alternative solutions to the same problem. Moreover, if for instance hypothesis h k has got enough evidential support and is accepted as the solution for the anomaly, there is no reason to keep the other rival tentative hypotheses as plausible hypotheses. Therefore, the acceptance of h k necessarily implies the abandonment of all other h i 's, i = k. Trivially, in this case the refutable auxiliary hypotheses of H which do not belong to H i should also be discarded. Since discarding or rejecting a hypothesis implies to take it as not plausible, after the acceptance of h k the rejected tentative auxiliary hypotheses h i , i = k, along with the rejected set of old auxiliary hypotheses H−H k ' should be taken as implausible. We shall call this the rejected auxiliary hypotheses (RAH) principle.
A logic of plausibility
In this section, we start the presentation of the formalism through which we intend to represent the process of solving anomalies as discussed in the previous sections. To start with, we need some way to represent the different statuses the members of theoretical systems might have. More specifically, we need to distinguish between certain, non-refutable statements belonging to T and plausible, refutable auxiliary hypotheses belonging to H. And among these latter, we need to distinguish between the strongly plausible auxiliary hypotheses which are accepted as part of the theoretical system and the tentative, weakly plausible hypotheses proposed as solution for an anomaly but not still accepted as part of the theoretical system. Moreover, we have to be prepared to account for statements such as observational reports, mathematical laws and definitional statements, for instance, which we want to take not only as certain, but as true.
In order to do that, we shall use some ideas regarding plausibility and modality presented in [15] , [12] and [3] and construe a normal modal semantic system where these conceptual subtleties of scientific change in anomalous contexts can be captured. More specifically, we shall use a multimodal language containing, in addition to the modal symbols and , a -like modality represented by the symbol ? and a -like one represented by the symbol !. These modalities, which shall be used in a post-fixed notation-if α is a formula then α? and α! are also formulae-are our logical representation of the notions of strong and weak plausibility: while α? means 'α is weakly plausible' or simply 'α is plausible', α! means 'α is strongly plausible' or 'α is plausibly accepted'. shall be interpreted as certainty, so that α is read as 'α is certain'; α shall mean something like 'α is epistemically possible.' Non-modality represents truthfulness: a non-modal formula α is read as 'α is true'. For the sake of simplicity, we shall restrict ourselves to the propositional case. 8 In order to account for this epistemic interpretation in terms of certainty and plausibility, we shall have two accessibility relations between worlds, one to account for the epistemically possible worlds to be used along with and , and other to account for the plausible worlds to be used along with ? and !. Let these two relations be represented, respectively, by R and R ? . Letting w ∈ W be an arbitrary world, R (w) ={w'|wR w'} represents the set of epistemologically possible worlds of (or accessible from) w and R ? (w) ={w'|wR ? w'} the set of plausible worlds of (or accessible from) the world w. The relation between these two sets is straightforward: every plausible world is a possible world (in symbols: R ? (w) ⊆ R (w)), but some possible worlds are not plausible.
Beside this restriction, there is an idealization concerning these accessibility relations: for every world w, there is a world w' such that wR w' and a world w" such that wR ? w". Finally, while R is a symmetric and transitive relation, R ? is only symmetric. Below we have the formal definition of this semantic model: DEFINITION 1 A model M is a quadruple < W,R ,R ? ,υ > where W is a set of possible worlds, R and R ? are two relations on W called, respectively, the epistemic possibility accessibility relation and the plausibility accessibility relation and υ is a function that assigns to each propositional symbol and world w ∈ W a value true or false, and the following conditions are satisfied: (i) Idealization: for every w ∈ W, there is at least one w' ∈ W such that wR w' and at least one w" ∈ W such that wR ? w". (ii) Possibility-Plausibility: for every w,w' ∈ W, if wR ? w' then wR w'; (iii) Symmetry: for every w,w' ∈ W, if wR w' then w'R w, and if wR ? w' then w'R ? w; (iv) Transitivity: for every w,w',w" ∈ W, if wR w' and w'R w" then wR w"
The condition on idealized models is there to guarantee that from certainty we get epistemic possibility (in symbols: α → α) and from strong plausibility we get weak plausibility (in symbols: α!→α?). The possibility-plausibility condition, which we have already mentioned, is a quite intuitive restriction which guarantees that from certainty we get strong plausibility (in symbols: α → α!) and from weak plausibility we get possibility (in symbols: α? → α). The symmetry condition guarantees that if α is true then it is certain that α is epistemologically possible and it is strongly plausible that α is weakly plausible (in symbols: α → α and α → α?!, respectively). Finally, the transitivity condition guarantees two introspection principles: a positive one saying that if we are certain about α then we are certain that we are certain about α (in symbols: α → α) and a negative one saying that if we are not certain about α, then we are certain that we are not certain about α (in symbols:
The reason why we have not imposed a transitivity restriction on R ? is that we might wish to allow for degrees of plausibility, which would be eliminated if we had α?? → α?, a principle derived from the plausibility version of the principle of introspection (α!→α!!). Neither have we imposed a reflexivity restriction on R and R ? . The reason for that is that this condition implies a principle of epistemological arrogance undesirable in the case of both certainty and skeptical plausibility: from the reflexivity of R we get that if α is certain then α is true (in symbols: α → α) and from the reflexivity of R ? we get that if α is strongly plausible then α is true (in symbols: α!→α). 9 The definition of the truth conditions of formulae is done as usual. Below we have such definition for the propositional and modal cases: 
DEFINITION 5
Let be a set of formulae and α a formula. α is a logical consequence of (in symbols: α) iff for all models M such that M , M α.
We then have the following relations:
On the formalization of laws and auxiliary hypotheses
The way this semantics is connected with our problem of representing scientific theoretical systems in anomalous contexts can be explained as follows. Let * = < T ,H,O > be the formalization of the theoretical system = < T,H > in our modal language; T and H are the formal counterparts of T and H, respectively, and O is a formalization of the set of relevant observational reports. Let in addition M = < W,R ,R ? ,υ > be a model such that M satisfies T ∪H∪O.
First of all, the non-modal formulae α of T ∪H∪O are satisfied by all possible worlds of M and therefore are taken as true. These formulae might be either observational reports or mathematical laws or definitional statements. As shown by (4), these formulae are both certain ( α) and plausible (α! and α?). Secondly, the laws of T, although perhaps not true from an unquestioned point of view, are taken as certain and, at least from the standpoint of the dynamics of scientific theories taken into account here, irrefutable. Their counterparts of T shall therefore be marked with the symbol . So, each formula α ∈ T (as well as the logical consequences of T) are of the form β, which from a semantic point of view means that for each world w ∈ W, β is satisfied by all epistemically possible worlds of w (in symbols: M w β for all w'∈ R (w).) Considering M as a model of reality, e.g. the laws of T can be taken as statements which, for each possible way w the world could be (according to this model), are true in any epistemologically possible world we can conceive from w. They are thus certain and irrefutable statements. Now suppose has got an anomaly. According to the way to deal with anomalies we have sketched in the previous sections, the postulates of T shall remain unchanged, and several tentative auxiliary hypotheses shall be proposed to solve the problem. This means first of all that T shall remain to be satisfied by M. Second, each tentative auxiliary hypothesis h must satisfy the TAH principle. This amounts, first of all, to h's being compatible with the laws of T and some subset of the old set of auxiliary hypotheses H. In semantic terms this means that for all w ∈ W, the formal counterpart of h, let us call it β, must be satisfied by at least one epistemically possible world of w (in symbols: M w β for at least one w ∈ R (w).) Second, along with T and a specific subset of H, h must be able to explain the anomaly (in symbols: T∪H' ∪ {h} A). This we have agreed is enough for us to take h as a weakly plausible hypothesis. Therefore h is to be represented as β?, which indicates that we are dealing with a plausible, tentative hypothesis. In semantic terms, this means that for each w ∈ W, β is satisfied by at least one plausible world of w (in symbols: M w β for at least one w' ∈ R ? (w).)
But there may be formula β which, although not satisfied by all epistemically possible worlds of a given w ∈ W, are satisfied by all plausible worlds (in symbols: M w β for all w' ∈ R ? (w) but M w β for at least one w" ∈ R (w).) Trivially then, these formulae are not certain. However they are more than weakly plausible; as we have defined above, they are strongly plausible (in symbols: β!). In the context of scientific theoretical systems, this amounts to saying that β is probably the formal counterpart of one of the accepted auxiliary hypotheses of H. In other words, since every accepted auxiliary hypothesis h is strongly plausible, its formal counterpart β is such that it is satisfied by all plausible worlds of every w ∈ W (in symbols: M w β for all w' ∈ R ? (w).) We then have h's formal representation as β!. See that even though enjoying this strong status as a plausible statement, β is still refutable and subject to revision, for there is at least one possible but non-plausible world which does not satisfies β (in symbols: for every w ∈ W, there is at least one w' ∈ R (w)−R ? (w) such that M w β). Following the same rationale and in order to distinguish the tentative auxiliary hypotheses from the accepted ones, we have to require that a tentative auxiliary hypothesis β be such that it is satisfied by at least one plausible world but not by all of such worlds (in symbol: for every w ∈ W, a tentative auxiliary hypothesis β? is such that for at least one w' ∈ R ? (w) M w β-which is implied by the semantic definition of ?-but also that for at least one w" ∈ R ? (w) M w β.)
This evaluation of accepted auxiliary hypotheses lets clear that the TAH criterion cannot be the only rational criterion by which we classify hypotheses as plausible. 10 In fact, a plausible world can be taken as a representation of the outcome of one or more rational criteria of hypothesis choice.
We thus say that a hypothesis which is true according to all these criteria represents a consensus strong enough for us to accept it, from a pragmatic point of view we might say, as true. In other words, even though we are not certain about the truthfulness of such hypothesis (be it from a methodological or from a realist point of view), the fact that it is true according to all plausible or rational ways we have at our disposal to evaluate hypotheses entitles us to accept it as a strongly plausible or pragmatic truth.
On the other hand, a tentative auxiliary hypothesis does not enjoy such sort of consensus: it is such that it is not satisfied by all plausible worlds, but by at least one of these worlds. This is more or less trivial, for as we have said, the several tentative auxiliary hypotheses are incompatible with each other in the sense that they consist of mutually exclusive, alternative solutions to the same problem. Let β? and ϕ? be two rival tentative auxiliary hypotheses. Further let the mentioned incompatibility take the form of T ϕ →¬β (which implies T β →¬ϕ.) Since then the laws of T are trivially satisfied by all plausible worlds of a given w ∈ W (in symbols: for all α ∈ T , M w α for all w' ∈ R ? (w)), we have that there are two plausible worlds w' and w" such that w' satisfies β and w" satisfies ¬β (in symbols: there are w',w" ∈ R ? (w) such that M w β and M w ¬β.) Thus, we have that both β and ¬β are plausible (in symbols: β? and (¬β)?), representing then a weak form of paraconsistency which some have called heartian or conceptual paraconsistency [16] , [1] . This paraconsistency, one must concede, is a feature that a logic of scientific change must have; it must be able to tolerate contradictions among weakly plausible hypotheses. Regarding accepted hypotheses, however, there cannot be such sort of tolerance: the whole system of theory laws plus the accepted hypotheses must be, even from a plausibility point of view, consistent. Therefore, there might be a model M' such that M' α? and M' (¬α)? but not a model M' such that M' α! and M' (¬α)!.
To sum up then, in a formalized system * = < T ,H,O > the laws of the theory are represented as certain, irrefutable statements (in symbols: for every α ∈ T , α is of the form ϕ) and the members O as non-modal formulae. In its turn, the set of auxiliary hypothesis H might have four kinds of formulae: (i) non-modal formulae representing true statements such as mathematical laws and definitional statements; (ii) formulae of the form ϕ representing the auxiliary hypotheses which, despite not being proved, are also taken as certain; (iii) formulae of the form ϕ! representing the refutable but accepted auxiliary hypotheses; and finally, in the case * represents a tentative theoretical system proposed to solve an anomaly, (iv) formulae of the form ϕ?, which represent plausible tentative auxiliary hypotheses satisfying the TAH criterion.
A logic for defeasible reasoning
Our task now concerns the representation of the refutability aspect of auxiliary hypotheses. In order to accomplish that we shall use a version of one of the most widespread non-monotonic logics [6]: Reiter's default logic [13] . 11 Let L be the modal language we used to build our logic of plausibility. Below we define a language meant to represent defeasible implications:
The language L is defined as follows:
α β ϕ means 'α non-monotonically implies β unless ϕ'. α β is an abbreviation for α β (p∧¬p), in the same manner that β ϕ is an abbreviation for (p∨¬p) β ϕ, where p is an arbitrary propositional symbol.
α β ϕ is really meant to function as a defeasible implication, according to which α's implying β is defeated in the presence of ϕ or ¬β. α, which is called the antecedent of the defeasible implication, represents the prerequisite of Reiter's default; β, which we call the consequent of the implication, plays the role of Reiter's consequent; and ϕ, which is named the exception of the defeasible implication, corresponds to the negation of the semi-normal part of Reiter's default. α β ϕ therefore corresponds to Reiter's default α : β∧¬ϕ/β.
Note that we require the consequent β of defeasible implications to be marked with a plausibility symbol. In this way we guarantee that only plausible, refutable formulae are non-monotonically inferred. Moreover, by imposing such a restriction on the form of defeasible implications, we establish an important connection between this logic and the modal but monotonic one we have introduced in Section 4: each defeasible implication shall be responsible for restricting the set of plausible worlds of the models able to satisfy the theory.
A more important connection, however, is that this multi-modal logic of plausibility functions as the monotonic basis of our non-monotonic logic. Below is the definition of our notion of extension. 
(S).
A set of formulae E ⊆ L is an extension of iff ϒ(E) = E, i.e. iff E is a fixed point of ϒ.
Note that we make the test of consistency of the consequent inside the very definition of extension, automatically preventing so-called abnormal defaults. Bellow we have a definition of the inferential relation of our non-monotonic logic.
DEFINITION 8
Let ⊆ L be a set of formulae possibly including defeasible implications and α ∈ L a formula. α is non-monotonically inferred from (in symbols: α) iff, for all extensions E of , α ∈ E.
DEFINITION 9
Let ⊆ L be a set of formulae possibly including defeasible implications. We call the set • ={α| α} the non-monotonic extension of .
On the formalization of the dynamics of scientific theories
In Section 5, we have suggested to formalize the auxiliary hypotheses with the help of our plausibility modalities. Although this works well in the case of static theoretical systems, it is insufficient if we want to give a satisfactory account of the dynamics of scientific theories in anomalous contexts.
As exemplified in the case of the anomalous movement of Uranus and discovery of Neptune, a satisfactory account of the development triggered by an anomaly has to take into account the change of statuses auxiliary hypotheses are subject to. According to the terminology we are using here, this amounts to make explicit the refutable character hypotheses might have, either as tentative or as plausibly accepted.
In order to do that we shall use the non-monotonic formalism introduced in the last section. To start with, let us define more rigorously the notion of formalized theoretical system.
DEFINITION 10 A formalized theoretical system
* is a triple < T ,H,O > where T ,O ⊆ L are sets of formulae representing, respectively, the theory and the set of observational statements, and H ⊆ L is a set of formulae possibly including defeasible implications representing the auxiliary hypotheses.
As we have agreed in Section 5, members of O are non-modal formulae, and members of T are certain, irrefutable statements of the form ϕ. Likewise, some hypotheses of H which are also taken as certain are represented as -formulae. The mathematical laws and definitional statements belonging to H are represented as non-modal formulae.
Regarding the refutable hypotheses of H, let us recall the RAH principle (to which every refutable hypothesis is subject to) according to which the acceptance of one tentative auxiliary hypothesis h turns into implausible all the others tentative hypotheses as well as the accepted (and refutable) ones that are incompatible with the solution h belongs to. 12 Going the other way round, we might say that a tentative auxiliary hypothesis remains so, i.e. tentative and plausible, unless is becomes implausible; and that a refutable accepted auxiliary hypothesis remains so, i.e. as an accepted auxiliary hypothesis of , unless it also becomes implausible. Therefore these refutable hypotheses might be represented, respectively, as defeasible implications of the form α? (¬α)? and β! (¬β)?, that is to say, as statements roughly saying 'α is to be considered as a plausible hypothesis unless it becomes implausible' and 'α is to be considered as an accepted auxiliary hypothesis unless it becomes implausible', respectively. Doing this, we have in normal circumstances that α? and β! belong to the non-monotonic extension of H (in symbols: α? ∈ H
• and β!∈H • ). However, once they become implausible their defeasible implications are blocked and as a consequence their belonging to H
• does not hold any more. 13 This, however, does only half the job; we have still to formalize the process by which a given auxiliary hypothesis becomes implausible. This, we know, starts at the moment when a new tentative auxiliary hypothesis comes into play. In its turn, this happens, the TAH principle tells us, when there is what we have called an anomaly, that is, (i) an observational report A which (ii) the theoretical system cannot explain, and there exists a new hypothesis h which (iii) alone cannot explain A but (iv) along with part of the theoretical system form a consistent set able to explain it. These four conditions, which summarize the TAH principle, can be formalized as follows: DEFINITION 11 Let * = < T ,H,O > be a formalized theoretical system, α ∈ O a formula representing an anomaly, H' ⊆ H a subset of the set of auxiliary hypotheses and ϕ ∈ L a formula. ϕ satisfies the TAH principle regarding α and H' and might therefore be taken as a tentative auxiliary hypothesis iff the following conditions are satisfied:
(iii) {ϕ} α; (iv) H' is such that for every β ∈ H−H' the set T ∪H' ∪{ϕ,β} is inconsistent; (v) T ∪H' ∪{ϕ} α.
Once a formula ϕ satisfies the TAH principle, then its defeasible version ϕ? (¬ϕ)? is included in * as a new member of H. By doing that, however, we set ϕ as a potential defeater of many of the old refutable auxiliary hypotheses of H. First, ϕ becomes a defeater of all hypotheses φ which do not belong to the subset of auxiliary hypotheses H' used for explaining α. This can be made explicit by including to H the defeasible implication ϕ! (¬φ)?, for once we have it we are able, from the acceptability of ϕ, to non-monotonically infer (¬φ)?, which is the direct defeater of the formal representation of φ in H: φ! (¬φ)?. In other words, if ϕ becomes accepted, φ! does not belong any more to H
• . See that the fact that ϕ is a defeater of φ is itself defeated by the implausibility of ϕ: ϕ!'s becoming accepted is formalized by the inclusion of ϕ! (¬ϕ)? (in H), which in the presence of (¬ϕ)? does not entail ϕ!.
Second, ϕ becomes a defeater of all other tentative auxiliary hypotheses β proposed to solve the anomaly α: if ϕ gets accepted, all these formulae become implausible. Following the same rationale laid down above, this can be formalized by including ϕ! (¬β)? in H. Moreover, all such other tentative auxiliary hypotheses β are also defeaters of ϕ: the acceptance of one of them shall make ϕ implausible. Once more this can be made explicit by including to H the defeasible implication β! (¬ϕ)?.
This process of auxiliary hypothesis change can be algorithmically represented as follows. where ! and ? are two simple functions meant to extract from H its plausible and accept hypotheses.
DEFINITION 13
Let ∈ L be a set of formulae possibly containing defeasible implications. We define the functions It is worth emphasizing that we are giving here a sketch just of one among several existing processes by which statements become plausible tentative auxiliary hypotheses (and as a by-product of this also giving an account of the process by which previously plausible hypotheses becomes 14 Trivially here '=' is not any more the identity relation, but an attribution operator.
by guest on December 20, 2010 jigpal.oxfordjournals.org Downloaded from implausible.) We also have to mention that we have been silent about the process by which tentative hypotheses become accepted.
Conclusion
We have offered in this article a logical analysis of the process of theory change due to anomalies. Our focus was on a particular, albeit quite traditional, way to cope with the appearance of anomalies: to leave the laws of the theory unchanged and propose new, tentative auxiliary hypotheses capable of explaining the anomaly. After investigating some key aspects of the process of theory change suffered by the Newtonian celestial mechanics in the case of the anomalous behaviour of Uranus, we proposed a multi-modal and non-monotonic logical framework able to represent, we tried to show, some key aspects of this important facet of the dynamics of scientific theories. Despite the fact that we have worked on an oversimplified view of several aspects of scientific theories-including its structure and dynamics-we believe that the ideas and results presented here do provide evidence for the fruitfulness of the broad logical approach we have decided to follow.
